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THE DEMISE OF ANONYMITY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO THE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME
1. INTRODUCTION
The vertiginous growth of the Internet has vastly expanded the means
of communication.' Cyberspace 2 enables people to share ideas over great
distances and engage in the creation of an entirely new, diverse, and
chaotic democracy, free from geographic and physical constraints.3 While
the demotic potential of cyberspace is well recognized,4 less known is that
individuals can reach audiences of thousands or even millions in ways that
conceal their true identities.5
To be sure, there are legitimate reasons for individuals to interact
anonymously on the Internet.6  Anonymity allows whistle-blowers and
political activists to express opinions critical of employers and the
government; it enables entrepreneurs to acquire and share technical
1. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing the Internet as "a
unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication"), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
2. NETLINGO DICTIONARY OF INTERNET WORDS: A GLOSSARY OF ONLINE JARGON WITH
DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY, at http://www.netlingo.com/inframes.cftn (last visited Sept. 21,
2002) [hereinafter NETLINGO]. The term refers more generally to the digital medium constructed
by computer networks. Id.; see also WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (Ace Books 1984)
(defining "cyberspace" as "[a] consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of
legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts ... A
graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human
system.").
3. See Ann Beeson, Top Ten Threats to Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, HUM. RTS., Spring
1996, at 10, 10 (stating that cyberspace is "probably the richest source of creative, diverse,
empowering and democratizing communication ever to connect people across the globe").
4. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835. Participants exchange information and opinion on a wide
variety of topics, leading the court to conclude that "the content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought." Id. at 842.
5. See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 133
(Times Books 1998). Godwin explains that the Internet has the potential to turn anyone into a
publisher with the reach of a newspaper or TV station. Id. at 10-12.
6. See Wendy M. Grossman, Surveillance by Design, SCI. AM., Sept. 2001, at 24.
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information without alerting their competitors, and permits individuals to
express their views online without fear of reprisals and public hostility.
7
Moreover, the right to speak anonymously is an important "aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."
8
The technology underpinning online anonymity, however, has come
under increasing scrutiny from law enforcement investigators who face
unique technical and legal challenges from criminals operating online. 9
Principally, the same technology that allows individuals to communicate
anonymously also enables criminals to hide their identities and evade
detection in cyberspace.' 0  Not surprisingly, investigators have been
searching for a technical solution that would enable them to trace the
perpetrators of computer crimes and expose their identities."
The global nature of cybercrime12 poses additional legal challenges to
law enforcement.' 3  Since cyberspace has no geographic boundaries,
computer criminals are free to operate from anywhere in the world. 14 They
can rest safe in the knowledge that targeted states cannot extend the
jurisdiction of their courts to impinge upon the sovereignty of harboring
nations.' 5
In effect, the infrastructure of cyberspace has made international
cooperation a necessity, requiring "a universal legal framework equal to the
worldwide reach of the Internet." 6 The Convention on Cybercrime (the
"Convention") is the Council of Europe's response to these unique
technical and legal challenges, the "first ever international treaty on
7. See id.
8. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). The Court held that a
ban on anonymity is a "direct regulation of the content of speech." Id. at 345.
9. See discussion infra Part II.B.
10. James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, Internet as the Scene of the Crime,
Remarks at the International Computer Crime Conference, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/roboslo.htm (May 29-31, 2000) [hereinafter Robinson, Remarks].
11. See id.
12. Id. The umbrella term covers various computer crimes, including crimes in which
computers are attacked, resulting in electronic theft or disruption of information or services, and
crimes in which computers are used to carry out conventional offenses from manipulating stocks,
to infringing of copyrights, and distributing child pornography. See id.
13. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Regulation of Computing and Information
Technology: Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and
Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 445 (1996) [hereinafter Flood Control] (noting that
countries with relaxed rules undercut the United States' ability to enforce its laws).
14. Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
15. See id.
16. Id. (quoting French President Jacques Chirac).
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criminal offences [sic] committed against or with the help of computer
networks such as the Internet."' 17  The final draft of the Convention,
approved in June 2001, is the outcome of four years of work by the
European Committee on Crime Problems ("CDPC") and experts from the
United States, Canada, Japan, and other countries.' 8  The United States
Department of Justice has been an active participant in the drafting process,
and hails the Convention as a pioneer effort that "breaks new ground" by
addressing the international nature of cybercrime, and as one that provides
a "solid basis" for international cooperation in law enforcement
investigations. 19
Other reactions have not been as favorable. 20  Indeed, twenty-two
associations in the United States and other nations have voiced concerns
that the Convention embodies measures that are "disproportionate,
destructive of liberty, and a threat to fundamental rights.' In particular,
the treaty's provisions for government access to computer data and
requirements compelling Internet providers to produce detailed logs of
network activity undermine individual privacy and the right to
communicate anonymously in cyberspace.22
17. Press Release, Council of Europe, 30 States Sign the Convention on Cybercrime at the
Opening Ceremony, at http://press.coe.int/cp/2001/875a(2001 ).htm (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter
30 States Sign the Convention]. The Convention was opened for signature on November 23,
2001, and was signed by twenty-six member states of the Council of Europe along with four non-
member states: Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States. Id. "The Council of Europe
is the continent's oldest political organiation [sic], founded in 1949." Press Release, Council of
Europe, The CE in Brief, at http://press.coe.int/press2/Press.asp?B=30,0,0,0,0&M =
http://press.coe.int/files/e-cebref.htm (June 30, 2001).
18. Press Release, Council of Europe, Council of Europe's Committee on Crime Problems
Approves Final Draft of Cyber-crime Convention, at http://press.coe.int/cp/2001/456a(200 1).htm
(June 22, 2001) [hereinafter Final Draft].
19. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/newCOEFAQs.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter FAQ ABOUT THE
CONVENTION].
20. Press Release, Council of Europe, Big Brother or Free-for-All-How Can the Law
Strike a Balance?, at http://press.coe.int/dossiers/107/E/e-bbfw.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2001)
[hereinafter Big Brother] ("Under the acronym GILC (Global Internet Liberty Campaign), 22
associations in nine European countries.., the US, Japan, Australia and South Africa are
campaigning against the draft Convention," because of their concern that the provisions on the
interception of electronic communications may jeopardize the integrity of personal data and the
right to anonymity.).
21. Id.
22. See Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Letter on Council of Europe Convention
on Cyber-Crime, to Council of Europe Secretary General, Walter Schwimmer, and COE
Committee of Experts on Cyber Crime [sic], at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1000.html
(Oct. 18, 2000).
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This Comment acknowledges that law enforcement has a legitimate
interest in combating computer crimes and that international cooperation is
essential to this effort. Nevertheless, providing the government with the
means to pry into private communications and to track anonymous users on
the Internet constitutes a radical curtailment of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of criminal law
enforcement in cyberspace, the unique technical and legal challenges posed
by electronic anonymity, and the drafting of the Convention designed to
meet the global threat of cybercrime. Part III briefly discusses the
development of constitutional law relating to anonymous speech. Part IV
criticizes those specific provisions of the Convention that restrict truly
anonymous speech on the Internet as being incompatible with the First
Amendment. Finally, Part V concludes that the United States must not
endorse the Convention in its current form, but instead must develop
international agreements upholding First Amendment liberties and the
precedence of the Constitution.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CYBERSPACE
A. The Global Threat of Cybercrime
A worm may have unleashed the worst attack in history.
2 3
Admittedly, this was not an attack upon life, but rather upon computers.
By the time accountants calculated the economic fallout, the "Love Bug"
computer worm24 had cost businesses worldwide an estimated $8.7 billion
in damage.25 To make matters worse, the college drop-out who confessed
to have "accidentally" released the worm in the form of an email
attachment got away with it because there were no applicable cybercrime
laws in the Philippines with which to charge him.26 The United States and
23. See Lynn Burke, Love Bug Case Dead in Manila, WIRED NEWS (Aug. 21, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1294,38342,00.html.
24. NETLINGO, supra note 2 (defining a "worm," also known as a "virus," as a small
computer program that proliferates by attaching copies of itself to other programs, subsequently
shutting down computers and networks.).
25. Kim Zetter, Viruses: The Next Generation, PC WORLD, Dec. 1, 2000, at 192 (citing
research firm Computer Economics).
26. Burke, supra note 23 (noting that the suspect was charged with credit card fraud, but the
charges were dropped due to insufficient evidence).
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the Philippines had entered into a "Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
(MLAT), '27 but to extradite him, a crime had to have been committed.28
The "Love Bug" and its "malicious code" 29 variants underscore the
world's dependence on computers and concurrent vulnerability to computer
attacks.30 Credit card theft alone is estimated to cost banks and individuals
some $400 million annually, while profits lost by firms from stolen patents
and trademarks amount to $250 billion-nearly five percent of world
trade.3' Not surprisingly, with computer attacks doubling each year,32
cybercrime has the capacity "to destabili[z]e a country's whole
economy. 33
The ease with which cybercrimes such as distributed "denial-of-
service 34 attacks can be carried out makes everyone a potential suspect.35
Almost anyone can download malicious code toolkits from the Internet and
unleash the computer equivalent of an Ebola virus. 3 6 Hackers37 have hit a
third of Great Britain's businesses and public authorities.38 In the United
States, nearly fifty percent of companies surveyed experienced attacks in
27. Id. By 1998, the United States had entered some twenty MLATs with foreign
governments in order to facilitate criminal prosecutions abroad. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S.
666, 715 (1998).
28. Burke, supra note 23.
29. Robert Lemos, Year of the Worm: Fast-Spreading Code Is Weapon of Choice for Net
Vandals, CNET NEWS.COM (Mar. 15, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2009-1001-
254061 .html?legacy=cnet. Several types of destructive programs, such as worms, viruses, and
Trojan horses, may be classified as malicious code. Id.
30. Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
31. Press Release, Council of Europe, Cyber-Crime-The Targets It Hits, the Damage It
Does, at http://press.coe.int/dossiers/107/E/e-cibles.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Damage] (citing several studies carried out in Europe and the United States).
32. Robert Lemos, Internet Attacks Seen Doubling in 2001, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 15,
2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-274435.html?legacy=cnet.
33. Damage, supra note 31 (quoting former FBI director Ronald L. Dick).
34. A distributed denial-of-service attack "flood[s] ... Web servers with false requests for
information, overwhelming the system and ultimately crashing it." How a "Denial of Service"
Attack Works, CNET NEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1017-
236728.html?legacy=cnet.
35. For example, in February 2000, a Canadian teen by the alias of MafiaBoy managed to
shut down several of the Internet's largest sites; however, "it [was] widely agreed that MafiaBoy
was neither ingenious or creative-he simply ran a computer script that clogged networks full of
garbage data." See Michelle Delio, The Greatest Hacks ofAll Time, WIRED NEWS (Feb. 6, 2001),
at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/ 1,1282,41630,00.html.
36. See Lemos, supra note 32 (discussing the ease and speed with which virulent programs
can proliferate through networks).
37. NETLINGO, supra note 2 (defining "hacker[s]" as "skilled programmers with the
reputation of having a mischievous bent for breaking into secured systems").
38. Damage, supra note 31.
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2001 39 and the Pentagon's computer systems have been attacked more than
22,000 times in a single year.40
Despite the staggering cost of computer attacks, Internet fraud and the
computer- facilitated theft of proprietary information are still the leading
causes of financial loss due to computer use.4' In addition, the human cost
of cybercrime often tolls without a fixed dollar figure for crimes such as
cyberstalking,4 2 child pornography,43 and identity theft.44
Computer security experts are also worried that a well-designed worm
could crash or even demolish the Internet in times of war.45 To underscore
that those are not idle concerns, in October 2001, the White House
appointed a cyberspace security presidential adviser to coordinate "efforts
to safeguard critical [communication] infrastructures." 46 Similarly, in view
of the disruptive potential of a cyberattack on the nation's critical
infrastructures, a congressional commission raised hacking to
"cyberterrorism," citing "the broad economic and operational consequences
of a shut down.""7
39. Sam Costello, Survey: Web Attacks Doubled in Last Year, INFOWORLD (Oct. 9, 2001),
at http://www2.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/01/10/09/011009hnsurvey.xml (citing survey by
security firm TruSecure). Among "primarily large corporations and government agencies," ninety
percent of 503 respondents surveyed by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) detected computer
security breaches within the previous twelve months, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in
losses. Press Release, Computer Security Institute, Cyber Crime Bleeds U.S. Corporations,
Survey Shows; Financial Losses From Attacks Climb for Third Year in a Row, at
http://www.gocsi.com/press/20020407.html (Apr. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Losses from Attacks].
40. Damage, supra note 3 1.
41. See Losses from Attacks, supra note 39.
42. CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A
NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (last updated Oct. 18, 1999).
43. CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON
THE INTERNET, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/dagceos.html (last updated Dec. 3,
1999) (arguing that child pornography on the Internet is an issue of international concern).
44. CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IDENTITY THEFT: THE CRIME OF THE NEW
MILLENIUM, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamarch2001_3.htm (last updated
Apr. 13, 2001) (arguing that the crime's impact upon the victim can be devastating).
45. Carolyn Meinel, Code Red for the Web, SCI. AM., Oct. 2001, at 42.
46. Jennifer Jones, White House Creates Cyberspace Security Post, INFOWORLD (Oct. 9,
2001), at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/01/10/09/011009hnclarke.xml.
47. Patrick Thibodeau, U.S. Commission Outlines Steps to Fight Cyberterrorism,
INFOWORLD (Oct. 18, 2001), at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml0/l0/18/
011018hncyberpanel.xml. See generally, Brian McWilliams, Pakistani Group Strikes US.
Military Web Site, NEWSBYTES (Oct. 21, 2001), at http://www.infowar.com/
hacker/Ol/hack_1022010j.shtml (reporting defacement of government web sites by a Pakistani
hacking group opposing U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan).
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In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the
United States, Congress passed a series of laws designed to assist federal
agents to combat terrorism by expanding the government's access to
electronic data in cyberspace. 48 For example, the new legislation expands
the list of identifying records that law enforcement may obtain with a
subpoena,49 and permits an Internet service provider (ISP) to "voluntarily
consent" to disclosing its customers' communication records during an
emergency. While these measures differ from the Convention's broader
provisions concerning the expedited preservation of data, they represent a
similar legislative push to track communication data and Internet use for
policing purposes.5'
Ironically, the lives of ordinary Americans who are not suspected of
having ties to terrorism will be affected by the government's expanded
definition of "cyberterrorism, ''52 because, under the new laws, a link to
suspected terrorism is not even necessary.53 As people increasingly rely on
computers and the Internet to engage in a wide variety of daily tasks,
common expectations of privacy also increase. However, increased
criminalization and employment of invasive technology to prevent crime
and terrorism may infringe upon civil liberties without actually delivering
48. Congress introduced several provisions in the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act
of 2001, which authorize the government to conduct secret surveillance if foreign intelligence is a
"significant purpose." USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 209-12, 224, 115
Stat. 272, 283-85, 295 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
49. USA PATRIOT Act § 210. See also CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FIELD GUIDANCE ON NEW AUTHORITIES THAT RELATE TO COMPUTER CRIME AND ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE ENACTED IN THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/PatriotAct.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2001).
50. USA PATRIOT Act § 212 (providing exception for civil liability of service providers
that make "voluntary disclosures" of content and non-content communication records in
emergencies).
51. See Julia Scheeres, EU Law Turns ISPs into Spies, WIRED NEWS (May 29, 2002), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,52829,00.html (comparing the European
Communications Data Protection Directive with the USA PATRIOT Act as similar legislative
efforts to track communications after the September 11 terrorist attack).
52. See USA PATRIOT Act § 814.
53. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2001). For example, an
amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act increases penalties for hackers who damage
"protected computers" used in furtherance of national security and criminal justice; lowers the
jurisdictional threshold damage to $5,000 in loss; and allows for aggregation of loss to meet that
amount, but without requiring a link between the offender and a suspected terrorist group or
organization. See id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).
2002]
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:81
any increased security.
54
B. Tracking Criminals in Cyberspace
1. The Electronic Frontier
The advent of the Internet poses a serious threat to traditional rules of
law because personal computers make it easier for criminals to evade
detection and prosecution.5 5 A single end-to-end transmission on the
Internet may often pass through a dozen or more types of carriers-for
example, telephone companies, satellite networks, and ISPs-in a number
of different countries employing various technical capabilities and subject
to different legal systems.5 6 Because electronic information easily flows
across territorial borders, the Internet is not as susceptible to traditional
regulatory controls.57 As a result, much of the Internet is free from the
regulation of any sovereign nation. 8
The globalization of crime impedes traditional investigative
procedures in several ways. 59 First, deterring and punishing cybercriminals
54. Carnivore and Magic Lantern, respectively, are the FBI's latest eavesdropping tools
capable of recording all the digital information associated with a specific person that passes
through a computer network, and recording every keystroke on that person's computer. See
Graham B. Smith, Comment, A Constitutional Critique of Carnivore, Federal Law Enforcement's
Newest Electronic Surveillance Strategy, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 481, 492, 499 (2001)
(arguing that Carnivore is a threat to Fourth Amendment privacy rights). But see Christopher
Woo & Miranda So, The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for
Increased Surveillance, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 521, 521-22 (2002) (arguing that the use of
Magic Lantern may be necessary to combat devious and sophisticated terrorists despite the risk of
intruding on people's right of privacy).
55. CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE
CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (last updated Mar. 2000) [hereinafter
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER].
56. Id.
57. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the
Internet's Role in Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 423, 426-27 (1998) (discussing the difficulty of regulating Internet transactions by
comparison to the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television technologies).
58. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 179 (1997).
59. See Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, Keynote Address at the Meeting of the
G8 Senior Experts' Group on Transnational Organized Crime, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/agfranc.htm (Jan. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Reno,
Keynote Address] (identifying four areas that international law enforcement must address: (1)
inadequate laws to prosecute computer crimes; (2) poor technical ability to locate cybercriminals;
(3) insufficient cooperation in the collection and sharing of evidence of the crimes; and (4) lack of
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requires an international legal framework to investigate and prosecute
computer offenses.60 Because information can be transmitted through data
networks that span the globe, an online offender can operate from a
location outside the jurisdiction that proscribes his activities. 61 For
example, although federal law prohibits the placing of wagers when either
or both the sender and receiver are in states or countries where gambling is
illegal,62 an Internet gambling site operating within a jurisdiction where
gambling is legal can still be accessed by persons residing in states or
countries where gambling is illegal. Similarly, an obscenity law interpreted
in light of local standards 63 may be evaded by an individual who publishes
an offensive Web site on a computer server located outside the locality.
Further, evidence stored on computers in remote or unknown locations
takes the investigation of cybercrimes outside the "exclusive purview of
any single jurisdiction" 64 and increases the chances that communication
data will become unavailable or lost, especially when criminals weave
communications through multiple countries.
65
Second, because everything on the Internet-from email to an
electronic heist66 -- is information, investigators must locate the true source
of the communication to connect the cybercrime with a real person in the
physical world.67 The infrastructure of the Internet, however, does not
provide a ready mechanism for tracing the "electronic trail" leading from
68the crime back to the perpetrator. In the absence of actual fingerprints,
the lack of identifying mechanisms on the Internet makes it especially easy
for criminals to disguise themselves, thereby frustrating the ability of law
enforcement to track them down.
69
For example, a savvy criminal can routinely cover one's tracks by
resources and trained personnel to investigate and combat high-tech crimes).
60. Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
61. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 55.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2001).
63. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
64. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 55.
65. Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
66. Electronic thieves, for example, have broken into the networks of United States banks
and carried out unauthorized electronic funds transfers to siphon amounts of up to $1 million out
of the system. See, e.g., Sandeep Junnarkar, Can Your Bank Stop an E-stickup?, ZDNET NEWS
(May 1, 2002), at http://.zdnet.com.com/2102-1106-896101.html; Robert Lemos, Western Union
Data Heist: "Human Error, " ZDNET NEWS (Sept. 10, 2000), at http://zdnet.com.com/2 100-1 -
523769.html.
67. See Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
68. Id.
69. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 55.
2002]
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providing false subscriber information when connecting to the Internet.70
Even when online services maintain a log of the Internet Protocol (IP)
number of the computer or the ISP from where the individual accessed the
Internet,71 the account used may have been hacked 72 and may not disclose
the actual source of the communication.
73
In addition, because the electronic trail of a crime may become
untraceable once the criminal is offline, another obstacle arises due to the
lack of communications data.74 Carriers maintain far fewer phone lines
than subscribers and often fail to retain the data necessary to link a
customer with a specific incoming line. 75 The easy solution is to require
carriers to retain access to user information for each link in the chain of
transmission to be able to identify the source of every call.76 This may not
be accomplished, however, without infringing on users' legitimate ability
77to remain anonymous.
Lastly, even if a foreign legal regime78 does not hamper a local
investigation, the "electronic trail" may go cold due to a slow response by
foreign law enforcement in providing assistance and cooperation in the
investigation of international computer crimes.79 Operational challenges in
coordinating the investigation of international crimes arise due to deficits in
the "preservation of and quick access to electronic data;' 80 deficiencies in
70. See Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
71. An IP number is a unique identifier for every computer or user connected to the Internet.
NETLINGO, supra note 2. In the case of a "dynamic IP," the number is assigned to a user for a
particular session, and when the user signs off, it is assigned to a new user. CHRISTOPHER M.E.
PAINTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRACING IN INTERNET FRAUD CASES: PAIRGAIN AND NEI
WEBWORLD, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamay200l 3.htm (last updated July
9, 2001) (By maintaining logs of IP numbers, dates, and exact times when the user logged on, it is
possible to identify the user who made the logs.).
72. Some service providers maintain "radius logs," which indicate the telephone numbers
from where the calls to the Internet were placed. See PAINTER, supra note 71.
73. Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
74. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 55.
75. Id. (The same identification number can be assigned to various users logging onto the
network at different times.).
76. See Reno, Keynote Address, supra note 59.
77. See discussion infra Part IV.A. (arguing for the preservation of truly anonymous online
communications coupled with user accountability).
78. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 55.
79. See id.
80. CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNIQUE ANNEX: PRINCIPLES TO
COMBAT HIGH-TECH CRIME, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminallcybercrime/principles.htm (last
updated Feb. 18, 1998).
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the "timely gathering and exchange of evidence;"'8' the lack of "transborder
electronic access by law enforcement to publicly available...
information;, 82 and the lack of international "forensic standards for
retrieving and authenticating electronic data for use in criminal
investigations., 83 A sufficient number of adequately trained and equipped
law enforcement personnel allocated to assisting investigators from other
countries is also essential to combat the global threat of cybercrime
8 4
2. Anonymous Communications
While experienced criminals know how to conceal their tracks in
cyberspace, anonymous software makes it possible for anyone to
completely erase the marks identifying the source of the communication, so
that pinning a person down to a geographic location becomes technically
impossible.8 5  For example, anonymous remailers8 6 enable users to send
electronic mail to people or newsgroups 87 without revealing their names or
email addresses to the recipients. By stripping the source IP address
information from email messages, remailers leave carriers without the
critical traffic data necessary to identify users, thereby posing an often
insurmountable technical challenge for law enforcement and private
industries.
88
A second identity-cloaking technique, appropriately known as




84. See Reno, Keynote Address, supra note 59.
85. Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
86. Andrd Bacard, Anonymous Remailer FAQ, at http://www.andrebacard.com/remail.html
(last updated Feb. 15, 2002). See, e.g., ULTIMATE ANONYMITY, at http://ultimate-anonymity.com
(last visited Aug. 20, 2002) (service provides tools and techniques enabling complete online
anonymity from anonymous web browsing and email, anonymous participation in newsgroups
and web based chat rooms); FILETOPIA: STRONG ENCRYPTION, CHAT & FILE SERVER, at
http://www.filetopia.org/home.htm (last visited Aug. 22., 2002) (technology allows individuals to
go online undetected, post anonymous messages, send scrambled messages, and block unwanted
email).
87. NETLINciO, supra note 2 (defining a "newsgroup" as a discussion forum on the Internet
which "allows users to post messages and reply to other users").
88. Dr. Fred Cohen, Center for Democracy & Technology, Cyber Threats and the US
Economy: Statement for the Joint Economic Committee, at http://www.cdt.org/security/dos/
000223senate/cohen.html (Feb. 23, 2000) ("The recent denial of service attacks could have been
defeated if it weren't for the ease of anonymity in the Internet.").
89. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2000) (describing encryption as "the
process of converting a message from its original form ('plaintext') into a scrambled form
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by scrambling or encoding every message into an unreadable form that no
one, except the intended reader, can decode within a reasonable time. 90 By
routing a message through a series of remailers and employing encryption,
the sender ensures that no one, not even the recipient, can identify the
source of the message. 9'
Similarly, "anonymizing" proxies 92 permit users to surf the web
incognito. Anonymizing proxies act as a "gateway" between the user's
workstation and the Internet by encrypting web content, hiding the user's
address identifier, and blocking "cookies" from being stored on the user's
hard drive.93  Because the content of one's sessions is scrambled,
unauthorized parties cannot obtain any identifying information, thus
ensuring one's privacy while surfing the web.94
Anonymous technology and encryption pose a considerable threat to
government and private institutions by enabling criminals to operate
surreptitiously, without fear of being detected. 95 However, because online
anonymity consists of the ability to control the electronic information used
to identify oneself,96 in the context of telecommunications, criminals are
indistinguishable from legitimate users of anonymous technology. Clearly,
this brings individuals who wish to remain anonymous on the Internet in
direct conflict with government, which would like to know exactly who is
accessing the network at any given time. However, regulating anonymous
technology by uniformly defeating the service providers' technical
guarantees of privacy is not a good solution, and, furthermore, constitutes a
ban on legitimate anonymous speech. The critical challenge for
governments is to control the new technology without eliminating its
legitimate uses.
('ciphertext').").
90. GODWIN, supra note 5, at 137.
91. By routing messages through a series of anonymous remailers, a technique known as
"chained remailing," neither the recipient nor any of the remailers in the chain can identify the
sender of the message without the cooperation of every prior remailer in the chain. Flood
Control, supra note 13, at 418. Further, remailer services usually refuse to retain subscriber
information. See id. at 415-18.
92. See, e.g., Anonymous Surfing Accelerator, Megaproxy, at http://www.megaproxy.com/
_anonymous/_surfing/_services/ (last modified Aug. 25, 2002).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 55.
96. Perrin Beatty, Canadian Minister of Department of Communications, Privacy Protection
in Telecommunications, at http://www.ifla.org/documents/infopol/canada/privacy.txt (last visited
Oct. 2, 2001).
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C. The International Convention
Governments have confronted the dangers of cyberspace by devoting
significant resources towards formulating a legal framework that addresses
the technical and operational challenges of computer crime. 97  The
Convention on Cybercrime (the "Convention") is the most comprehensive
response to date.98  Considered "one of the most important legal
instruments elaborated within the Council of Europe," 99 the Convention
was approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
(COE),100 and on November 23, 2001, the Convention was signed by
twenty-six member states of the COE along with four non-member states-
Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States. 10 1 Although only two
countries have ratified the treaty,10 2 the Convention will go into effect
"three months after the date on which five States, including at least three
member States of the Council of Europe," have ratified it.'
03
1. Measures to Be Taken
The main objective of the Convention, as defined in the preamble, is
to pursue "a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society
against cybercrime, inter alia by adopting appropriate legislation and
fostering international co-operation.' ' 0 4 The final draft of the Convention
covers three main topics: (1) harmonization of the national laws defining
substantive criminal offenses; (2) definition of investigative and procedural
provisions to cope with global networks; and (3) establishment of
97. See Robinson, Remarks, supra note 10.
98. See Final Draft, supra note 18.
99. Id. (quoting Hans Christian KrOger, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of
Europe).
100. 30 States Sign the Convention, supra note 17.
101. Id.
102. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, European Treaty Series (ETS) no. 185,
Ratification Status, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searchsig.aspNT= 185&CM=
I&DF=21/I 1/02 (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). The Council of Europe is also working on the First
Protocol, which criminalizes "hate speech," and on a Second Protocol to address how to identify,
filter, and trace communications between suspected terrorists. Declan McCullagh, Beefed-Up
Global Surveillance?, WIRED NEWS (Feb. 20, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/
politics/0, I 283,50529,00.html.
103. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, European Treaty Series (ETS) no. 185,
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procedures to create an effective system of international cooperation.
10 5
The Convention defines substantive criminal laws to be legislatively
adopted by all signatory states. It covers crimes in four main categories:
(1) "offenes [sic] against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer data and systems;"' 1 6 (2) computer-related offenses; 0 7 (3)
content-related offenses (for example, child pornography);'0 8 and (4)
"offences [sic] related to infringements of copyright and related rights."'0 9
In addition, signatory nations must criminalize attempting and aiding or
abetting of the offenses defined in accordance with Articles 2 through 10 of
the Convention;110 provide for criminal corporate liability;"' and ensure
that criminal offenses are "punishable by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty."' 1 2 To take into
account the different legal systems of the signatory nations, the crimes are
broadly defined, and an explanatory memorandum 13 describes the crimes
in more detail to ensure that parties enforce the Convention in a consistent
manner. 114
The Convention also seeks to harmonize new procedures and rules of
"mutual assistance" to aid law enforcement in the investigation of
cybercrimes." 5 Signatory countries are required to ensure that certain
measures are available under their national law: "[e]xpedited preservation
of stored computer data;"' 16 expedited preservation and disclosure of traffic
data; 117 the ability to order a person to provide computer data and to order
an ISP to provide subscriber data under its control; "[r]eal-time collection
105. See Final Draft, supra note 18.
106. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, arts. 2-6.
107. Computer offenses include those committed with the intent to falsify computer data
and those causing the loss of property by computer-related fraud. Id. arts. 7-8.
108. Id. art. 9.
109. Id. art. 10.
110. Id. art. 11.
111. Id. art. 12.
112. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 13(1).
113. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, European Treaty Series (ETS) no. 185,
Explanatory Report, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/HtmU185.htm (Nov. 8, 2001)
[hereinafter Explanatory Report].
114. FAQ ABOUT THE CONVENTION, supra note 19.
115. Press Release, Council of Europe, Main Lines of the Convention, at
http://press.coe.int/dossiers/107/E/e-grdlignes.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Main
Lines].
116. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 16.
117. Id. art. 17.
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of traffic data;"1 8 and interception of content data." 9
The Convention provides that signatory countries must adopt
measures to establish jurisdiction over any offenses committed in their
respective territories or by their nationals. 20  Moreover, the Convention
empowers legal authorities and police in one country to collect evidence of
cybercrimes for police in another country, and establishes a "24/7
network"' 12 1 operating around the clock, seven days per week, to provide
immediate assistance with ongoing investigations.
22
2. Privacy Concerns
If ratified, the Convention will be the first international treaty to allow
police in one country to request that their counterparts abroad collect an
individual's computer data, have the individual arrested and extradited to
serve a prison sentence abroad. 123 Given the unprecedented exchange of
personal data between participating countries, some of which may have
lesser standards of privacy and due process, individuals should be
concerned about the collection and monitoring of their personal
information. While the Convention makes a passing reference to a number
of international instruments which provide protection for personal data, 24 it
does not, however, specify what safeguards must apply.
25
Article 15 of the Convention, which deals with "conditions and
safeguards," states that the "establishment, implementation and application
of the powers and procedures provided for in [Section 2 of the Convention
pertaining to procedural law] are subject to conditions and safeguards"
provided under the domestic law of each signatory country, 126 but it does
118. Id. art. 20.
119. Id. art. 21.
120. Id. art. 22.
121. Id. art. 35.
122. See Main Lines, supra note 115.
123. See generally Mike Godwin, International Treaty on Cybercrime Poses Burden on
High-Tech Companies, IP WORLDWIDE (Apr. 4, 2001), at http://www.law.com (explaining that
this treaty would permit extradition of computer users in other countries).
124. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, pmbl.
125. See Center for Democracy & Technology, Comments of the Center for Democracy and
Technology on the Council of Europe Draft "Convention on Cyber-crime" (Draft No. 25), at
http://www.cdt.org/intemationa/cybercrime/010206cdt.shtml (Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinafter CDT
Comments] (criticizing the Council of Europe, a governmental body created to promote human
rights, for not specifying what privacy protections should limit government authority).
126. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 15.
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not require such provisions to be actually instituted. 127  Instead, the
Convention merely hints at vague procedural safeguards, 128 while granting
broad powers to government investigators in countries such as Romania
and Albania, 29 former Soviet bloc nations that have a less than robust
tradition of checks and balances on police power.
30
What would also change under the Convention is that in addition to
complying with requests submitted by U.S. law enforcement officials, ISPs
and telephone companies would have to respond to warrants and court
orders from forty-three Council of Europe nations. 131  Because the
Convention mandates "mutual assistance" and extradition between nations
without requiring "dual criminality,"' 32 a U.S. citizen or corporation may
be prosecuted abroad for crimes that do not exist in the United States.
1 33
The lack of dual criminality is a special problem when considering the vast
differences in punishment for similar offenses and the considerable lack of
adequate due process and human rights protections in various countries.
34
Not surprisingly, the Convention has met with vigorous opposition.
135
Both corporate interests, such as AT&T, as well as civil liberties groups,
such as Privacy International and the Center for Democracy & Technology,
have decried the financial and privacy costs of the Convention. 36  In
particular, civil liberties groups and ISPs have voiced a common objection
to the requirement that ISPs and network administrators keep detailed logs
of network activity. 137  ISPs have also opposed the Convention on the
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Albania and Croatia are the only member states of the Council of Europe so far to have
ratified the treaty. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, European Treaty Series (ETS)
no. 185, Ratification Status, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT=
185&CM= I&DF=21/I 1/02 (last visited Nov. 21, 2002).
130. Godwin, supra note 123.
131. See id.
132. United States courts hold that dual criminality is satisfied if the offense charged is
"considered criminal under the laws of both surrendering and requesting nations." Murphy v.
United States, 199 F.3d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 765 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
133. See Godwin, supra note 123.
134. See Ellen Goodman, The Hidden Suffering of Women in Afghanistan, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 6, 1998, at D7 (demonstrating the value of dual criminality by analogizing to the protection
of human rights in the case of women).
135. See Big Brother, supra note 23.
136. See Godwin, supra note 123; see also CDT Comments, supra note 125.
137. Lesley Stones, Forty Nations Unite to Define Cybercrime and Fight Net Bandits, BUS.
DAY (South Africa), Nov. 2, 2000, at 20 (reporting that "[m]any service providers believe that
such clauses would breach the confidentiality agreements they sign with their customers").
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ground that it does not provide reimbursement for the increased costs of
surveillance and storage of information.1 38  The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the world's largest business federation representing more than
three million members, has warned that the Convention would impose
"unworkable and possibly unlawful restrictions" on U.S. firms. 13 9
The requirement that signatory nations enact measures to "obtain the
expeditious preservation of specified [stored] computer data," including
traffic data, 140 directly impacts providers of anonymous technology, and
may defeat the ability of individuals to send and receive anonymous
messages over the Internet. 14' The requirement that each signatory adopt
"legislative and other measures as may be necessary" to compel service
providers to disclose subscriber information under their control 142 has a
concurrent effect. The stored data includes the "subscriber's identity,
postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing
and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or
arrangement."1
43
While the text of the Convention does not explicitly state that a
provider, such as an anonymous remailer, must collect and keep
information to identify its customers, any electronic data already stored in
the provider's computer network must be turned over to the appropriate
authorities. 144  Ironically, the recent Communications Data Protection
Directive passed by the European Parliament 145 has affirmed the concern
that after signing the treaty governments would be prompted to enact
legislation forcing service providers to be able to always identify their
customers. 1
4 6
138. See Privacy International, Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Electronic *Privacy Information Center and Privacy International on Draft 27 of the Proposed
CoE Convention on Cybercrime, at http://www.privacyintemational.org/issues/
cybercrime/coe/ngoletter 601.htm (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter ACLU Letter].
139. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Opposes European Cyber
Crime Treaty, at http://www.uschamber.com/Press+Room/2000+Releases/December+2000/00-
229.htm (Dec. 8, 2000).
140. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, arts. 16-17.
141. See CDT Comments, supra note 125.
142. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 18.
143. Id. art. 18(3)(b).
144. See id. art. 18.
145. The directive, which faces approval by the fifteen European Union member countries,
mandates that telecommunications companies keep detailed records of customers' data. Julia
Sheeres, Europe Passes Snoop Measure, WIRED NEWS (May 30, 2002), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,52882,00.html.
146. CDT Comments, supra note 125.
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Lastly, Article 19 requires that signatory parties adopt laws that
compel "any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the
computer system or measures applied to protect the computer data therein"
to disclose the "necessary information"' 4 7 required to retrieve any stored
data, which effectively bans encryption.148 In view of the Convention's
broad requirements for data preservation, divulgence of subscriber
information, and compelled disclosure of encryption code, the treaty is
certain to have a chilling effect on anonymity online.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANONYMITY
A. Anonymous Speech and the First Amendment
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . ,,149 The First Amendment does not specifically mention
anonymous speech,1 50 but considering that the authors of the Federalist
Papers concealed their identities when writing in support of the
Constitution, anonymity may be essential to political freedom itself.1 5'
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment "to prevent
the majority, through acts of Congress, from silencing those who would
express unpopular or unconventional views."'' 52 A primary function of the
amendment is to ensure political discourse. 53 The Court has repeatedly
endorsed a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'
' 54
Presumably, such openness affirms anonymous political speech, but while
political speech "occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First
147. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 19(4).
148. See ACLU Letter, supra note 130 (explaining that both the encryption code and the
plain text of the encrypted files must be turned over to the authorities).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
150. See id. Nor is there a "record of discussions of anonymous political expression either
in the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights, or in the state ratifying conventions."
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). Justice Black noted that persecuted
groups throughout history have been able to challenge oppression "either anonymously or not at
all." Id. at 64. Anonymous publishing was so widespread during the Revolutionary period that
only two Federalist essays appear to have been signed by their authors. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at
368 (Thomas, J., concurring).
152. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
153. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
154. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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Amendment,"' 5 5 anonymity has strong detractors on the Court. 56
Indeed, on first impression, anonymity seems deviant, positively
anarchical. Why would people want to hide their true identity? For some,
this is cause for immediate suspicion.157 It is not surprising, therefore, that
even though anonymous authors have long been acknowledged as having
made invaluable contributions to civilization,' 58 the courts have only
recently regarded anonymous speech as a right protected by the First
Amendment. 
59
1. Freedom of Association and Inviolable Privacy
It is well established that the people may advocate their political
beliefs without state scrutiny. 60 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,'61 the Supreme Court upheld the NAACP's refusal to disclose
its membership list in accordance with a court order because compelled
disclosure would have curtailed the members' ability to promote their
common beliefs. 162 The NAACP showed that such prior disclosures of its
members' identities subjected them to economic reprisals and public
hostility.
63
In effect, the state was unable to demonstrate that the membership list
was essential to a governmental purpose) 64 Against the efforts of the state
to compel the NAACP to cease its activities in Alabama, the Court
recognized that the "inviolability of privacy" might be "indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses
155. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346.
156. See id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the "very purpose" of anonymity is
to facilitate wrongs by "eliminating accountability.").
157. See Cohen, supra note 88 ("1 find that the ability to act with relative anonymity in the
Internet is primarily being used for criminals to avoid attribution and to hide their crimes.").
158. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64 ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books
have played an important role in the progress of mankind.").
159. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (stating that anonymity "exemplifies the purposes behind the
Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society.").
160. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Political
expression receives the broadest protection "to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
161. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
162. Id. at 462-66.
163. Id. at 462.
164. Id. at 466.
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dissident beliefs."
' 165
The nexus between privacy, anonymity, and political expression was
expanded in later decisions. 166  In the landmark case, Talley v.
California,167 the Court upheld one individual's interest to remain
anonymous when distributing handbills advertising a boycott against
certain employers accused of discriminating against minorities. 168 Talley
recognized that "anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most
constructive purposes."' 169 In Talley, the Supreme Court extended its earlier
decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin170 that the freedom to distribute
information is essential to the freedom of expression, and that an
"identification requirement" would tend to restrict that freedom.'
7'
2. Strict Scrutiny and Content-Based Restrictions
Both Patterson and Talley recognized that only a compelling
governmental interest could impinge on the freedom of speech and
association, advancing significant protection for anonymous speech.1
72
However, the ordinance at issue in Talley was deemed void on its face
because it was overbroad, barring all anonymous handbills "under all
circumstances anywhere.' 73  By contrast, in Buckley v. Valeo,'74 by
employing the same "strict standard of scrutiny" to evaluate an ordinance
that curtailed anonymous political speech, the Court reached a different
conclusion. 175 The Buckley court held that while disclosure requirements,
165. Id. at 462.
166. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982) (noting
that the "Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations");
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480, 490 (1960) (holding invalid a statute that compelled
teachers to disclose associational ties); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 529 (1960)
(holding that the NAACP did not have to disclose its membership list at the peril of its freedom of
assembly).
167. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
168. Talley, 362 U.S. at 63-65 (invalidating a flat ban on the distribution of handbills).
169. Id. at 65.
170. 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938) (holding that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of literature without a permit was an unconstitutional infringement on First
Amendment freedom of speech and of the press).
171. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
172. See id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing the holding in Patterson, 357 U.S. at 463,
464).
173. Id. at 64.
174. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
175. Id. at 75. The Court upheld mandatory disclosure of campaign-related expenditures to
the Federal Election Campaign Act, because the requirement was "narrowly limited to those
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by themselves, "can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief
guaranteed by the First Amendment,"'176 governmental interests can be
"sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement.' ' 177
More recently, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,'78 the
Court struck down as unconstitutional Ohio's prohibition on the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature. 179  In this case, Mrs.
McIntyre distributed leaflets that communicated opposition to a proposed
school tax levy, to people attending a public meeting at a middle school in
Westerville, Ohio.18 0 The Ohio Tax Commission charged Mrs. McIntyre
with violating a state statute prohibiting the distribution of "unsigned
documents designed to influence voters in an election"' 8'1 because some of
Mrs. McIntyre's handbills purported to express the views of "Concerned
Parents and Tax Payers."'
8 2
The state argued that the prohibition prevented "the dissemination of
untruths" intended to influence the electoral process. 8 3  Rejecting this
argument, the Court noted that the Ohio statute contained "no language
limiting its application to fraudulent, false, or libelous statements." 18 4 As in
Patterson and Talley, the McIntyre Court was concerned that a ban on
anonymity "places a more significant burden on advocates of unpopular
causes than on defenders of the status quo.' 8 5 As such, the ban could be
viewed as retaliation against an unpopular point of view-as an outright
and "direct regulation of the content of speech.'
86
Principally, McIntyre illustrates that "our society accords greater
weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.' 8 7
However, the case may likewise be interpreted as being limited to
protecting political speech, which "by its nature will sometimes have
situations where the information sought has a substantial connection with the governmental
interests sought to be advanced." Id. at 81.
176. Id. at 64.
177. Id. at 66.
178. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
179. Id. at 357.
180. Id. at 337.
181. Id. at 338.
182. Id. at 337.
183. Id. at 344.
184. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344.
185. Id. at 345 n.8.
186. Id. at 345.
187. Id. at 357.
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unpalatable consequences.' ' 8 8 Indeed, the Court indicated that even in the
context of political speech, which occupies the "core of the protection"
granted by the First Amendment, it would uphold a statute "narrowly
tailored" to serve a clear and important government objective. 89 Thus,
despite McIntyre's rhetoric about the "tradition of anonymity in the
advocacy of political causes, ' 90 the Court recognized that "a State's
enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification
requirement."
191
Because of its narrow holding, McIntyre's significance to the
regulation of non-political anonymous speech is uncertain in situations
where the government's objective in the regulation is substantial.
19 2
Nevertheless, McIntyre marks a significant departure from the Court's
jurisprudence culminating with Talley, holding that the "identity of the
speaker is no different from other components of the document's content
that the author is free to include or exclude."' 93 By suggesting that the
author's decision to remain anonymous is a decision "concerning omissions
or additions to the content of a publication,"' 94 the Court implied that
regulations of anonymity should be subject to the same exacting scrutiny
that applies to content-based restrictions on speech. 95  Further, recent
decisions by lower courts upholding anonymous authorship on the Internet
indicate that McIntyre's holding may be generalized to non-political speech
in the electronic media as well as in print.
196
B. Anonymity on the Internet
Speech on the Internet enjoys the same level of protection from
governmental interference as does speech in traditional public forums.'
97
188. Id.
189. Id. at 346-47.
190. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343.
191. Id. at 353; but see Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 188-89,
199 (1999) (invalidating a Colorado requirement that petition circulators be registered voters,
wear identification badges, disclose their names, addresses, and the total amount they were paid).
192. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("We do not thereby hold that the
State may not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by
disclosing its identity.").
193. Id. at 348.
194. Id. at 342.
195. Id. at 346.
196. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001); see
also ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
197. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Indeed, as "the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed,"'
' 98
the Internet has enjoyed relatively greater immunity from government
supervision and regulation than other media.199 While the Supreme Court
has yet to weigh the constitutionality of a restriction on anonymous Internet
speech, several federal courts have upheld the right of individuals to remain
anonymous online.
200
1. Unmasking John Doe
In ACLU v. Miller,20 1 a federal district court enjoined a Georgia
statute that prohibited fraudulent transmissions on the Internet. °2
Specifically, the statute made it illegal to falsely identify oneself while
transmitting information over the Internet.20 3 The court concluded that the
statute was not drafted precisely enough to avoid proscribing protected
speech.204 Citing McIntyre, the court determined that Georgia's online
identification requirement constituted "a presumptively invalid content-
based restriction., 20 5 Further, the statute was not narrowly tailored to only
prohibit "fraudulent" transmissions, as defined in the criminal code.20 6
Even though the legislation could be used to prosecute persons who falsely
identify themselves in order to defraud the public, the statute was
constitutionally invalid because it targeted a "substantial category of
speakers" who employ deception and anonymity to avoid being ostracized
or harassed, to prevent being discriminated against, or to protect their
privacy.20 7
Similarly, in a precedent-setting case dealing with online defamation,
a federal district court in Washington quashed a subpoena issued by a
private corporation seeking to force an ISP to disclose the identity of
persons who spoke anonymously on a message board.20 8 Specifically, the
198. Id. at 883.
199. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-69 (1997).
200. See, e.g., Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 771 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001); 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1097; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185
F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
201. 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
202. Id. at 1231, 1235.
203. Id. at 1230.
204. Id. at 1233 (holding that the Georgia statute was "not readily susceptible to a limiting
construction and.., not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest").
205. Id. at 1232.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1233.
208. 2TheMart.com., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. The court said that "[a ]court order, even
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court considered several factors in determining whether a subpoena should
issue and concluded that when First Amendment rights are at stake, only
information "directly and materially relevant" to a core claim or defense
can outweigh the individual's right to speak anonymously. 209 The court
emphasized that "[p]eople who have committed no wrongdoing should be




Encryption technology is crucial to sending and receiving truly
anonymous communication on the Internet. 21 Rather than preventing the
disclosure of the "non-content" source of the message, such as the address
header, which is erased by the remailer, encryption ensures that the actual
44 212"content" of the electronic message remains anonymous. A discussion
regarding encryption and the various government proposals to regulate it is
beyond the scope of this Comment.21 3 Attempts to ban encryption have
been unsuccessful, however, and the nature of the technology is such that
214the most severe laws could not completely curtail its use. Current U.S.
policy allows consumers access to privacy-enhancing encryption.215 This is
the outcome of both a long debate in Washington over improving privacy
online216 and judicial recognition of the connection between the regulation
of cryptography and people's ability to communicate privately and
anonymously in "an increasingly monitored world.,
217
when issued at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit, constitutes state action and as such
is subject to constitutional limitations." Id. at 1091-92.
209. Id. at 1095.
210. Id. at 1092 (citing Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578).
211. See Flood Control, supra note 13, at 418-20.
212. See id.
213. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995) (giving a comprehensive discussion of
encryption).
214. See HENRY B. WOLFE, CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPERS No. 42, THE MYTH OF
SUPERIORITY OF AMERICAN ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS, available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/briefs/bp42.pdf (Nov. 12, 1998).
215. Press Release, Center for Democracy & Technology, New U.S. Encryption
Regulations a Major Step Forward for Online Privacy, at http://www.
cdt.org/press/000113press.shtml (Jan. 13, 2000).
216. Id.
217. See Michael Froomkin, Statement on the Bernstein Decision, at
http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/bemstein99.htm (May 7, 1999) (describing the Ninth
Circuit's decision upholding encryption source code as protected speech as a major victory for
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Although the U.S. government continues to impose restrictions on the
export of encryption, in three separate lawsuits218 cryptographers have
argued that the requirement to obtain an export license before publishing
encryption source code219 on the Internet constitutes censorship of
protected First Amendment speech. In one of the cases, Bernstein v. Dep 't
of State,220 a district court held that encryption software is "expression" for
First Amendment purposes and is entitled to protection against an order
that precludes a person from speaking in advance. 221 Although district
courts in two other cases rejected similar challenges and upheld the federal
222export regulation, a more recent decision on this matter issued by the
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that "the First Amendment protects computer
source code.223  By designating source code as expressive speech, the
court ensured that a ban on encrypted computer code would be subject to
the same exacting scrutiny that applies to all content-based restrictions on
speech.224
IV. THE BIG CHILL: THE CONVENTION'S EFFECTS ON SPEECH
A. Privacy, Anonymity, and Expression
As the Internet exceeds 200 million users worldwide,225 individuals
increasingly must contend with the "information wants to be free"
imperative of cyberspace.226 The digitization of information ranging from
privacy and the First Amendment).
218. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. Dep't of State, 922 F.
Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Bernstein v. Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Bernstein v. Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, Bernstein v. Dep't of
State, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (opinion withdrawn pending en banc review); Karn v. U.S.
Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
219. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3 n.1 (explaining that source code expresses a cryptographic
algorithm, which is a precise set of programming operating instructions that enables a computer
to transform data into an unintelligible form).
220. 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
221. Id. at 1305-06.
222. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Karn v. Dep't of State, 925
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
223. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2000).
224. See Sable Communications of California, Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(holding that the state may impose a content-based restriction to promote a "compelling state
interest" and only through "the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest").
225. Stephen E. Arnold, Internet Users at Risk: The Identity/Privacy Target Zone,
SEARCHER, Jan. 1, 2001, at 24.
226. See Vin Crosbie, Information Wants to Be Free (or Does It?), CLICKZ TODAY (July 2,
2002]
106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.23:81
records of telephone calls and surfing habits, to medical history and
financial statements, allows governments and private interests to assemble
composite "profiles" of Internet users without their knowledge, and to
create an electronic picture of the relationships that exist among events and
people. 227  Although the concept of a constitutionally-protected "zone of
privacy" 228 is beyond the scope of this Comment, two facets of privacy are
germane to anonymity, and concern (1) the right of the individual "not to
have [one's] private affairs made public by the government, 229 and (2) the
right to remain free from governmental compulsion when making certain
kinds of important decisions.230 Both of these aspects are implicated by a
requirement to compel individuals to identify themselves whenever they
log online.
1. A Web of Associations
A requirement to identify oneself in order to gain access to the
Internet poses a serious burden on autonomy and "spontaneous
expression., 231 Indeed, the decision to remain anonymous can be seen as a
decision "to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. 232 For some
time, the court has been aware of "the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks" and the potentially embarrassing and harmful effects of
233unwarranted disclosure. The aggregation of personal information from
diverse sources enables others to form opinions about the user and to target
the user for marketing or discrimination based on one's profile, which has
been turned into a public commodity.2 34
2002), at http://www.clickz.com/design/freefee/print.php/l37889.
227. Arnold, supra note 225, at 28-29.
228. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution protects a right of privacy and
personal autonomy. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & nn. 23-26 (1977) (discussing
diverse aspects of privacy that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such as the right to
be let alone, and a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy).
229. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24 (quoting with approval Philip B. Kurland, The Private I,
U. CHI. MAG. 7, 8 (1976)) (outlining three aspects of privacy, and drawing a distinction between
the right to be free from governmental surveillance, which is protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and two aspects of privacy, which are implicated by an identification requirement).
230. Id.
231. See Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 1981).
232. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
233. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
234. See Arnold, supra note 225, at 36-37.
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In this respect, anonymity on the Internet works as a "firewall 235
against unwanted intrusions on privacy from larger and faster machine
networks that continually record and compile the online habits, personal
preferences, and identifiable transactional data236  of millions of
unsuspecting users.237 Electronic anonymity safeguards the individual's
interest in selectively revealing oneself to others, which is a function of the
"ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept
of liberty. 238 On the Internet, where much of the detailed collection of
data takes place within "virtual communities,, 239 the ability to remain
anonymous is part of the autonomy that is indispensable to defining oneself
and forming associations online. 40
The Internet may be a computer network, but it is really a
"community of people. 24 1 Seemingly countless electronic forums, mailing
lists, and "meeting places" 242 have proliferated in cyberspace, promoting
written exchanges, information, and support for individuals on a wide
235. Anonymizers and firewalls work in the same way. A firewall is a security device that
"stands" between a computer or private network and the Internet. CONSUMER PRIVACY
GUIDE.ORG, GLOSSARY OF INTERNET PRIVACY TERMS, at
http://www.consumerprivacyguide.org/glossary (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) [hereinafter
GLOSSARY OF IPT]. By relaying web traffic through an intermediary server, the security system
keeps the computer from being accessible to others. Id.
236. Transactional data, which describes information revealed in the normal course of using
the Internet, differs from the content of a communication since it is not the actual substance of the
message, but rather the information about the communication. See GLOSSARY OF IPT, supra note
235.
237. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Young Investor Web Site Settles FTC
Charges, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9905/younginvestor.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001)
(discussing how Web site promised that information collected from users, who were children,
would be held anonymously, but maintained the information in a way that linked it with each
child); see also Adam Clayton Powell III, E-Privacy Complaint Filed with FTC, FREEDOM
FORUM, at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=11676 (last
visited Aug. 20, 2002).
238. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (citations omitted).
239. Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the
First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1640 (1995) (The Internet is "designed to
bring together like-minded individuals, regardless of where they live, work, or play...
unbounded by geographical, temporal, or other physical barriers.").
240. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. The Court recognized a constitutional protection for "the
formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships." Id. at 618.
241. Praise for 'Caring' Chatroom Community, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2002), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/1883939.stm.
242. Jerry Finn, An Exploration of Helping Processes in an Online Self-Help Group
Focusing on Issues of Disability, 24 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 220, 221 (1999) (discussing online
self-help and mutual aid groups that use the Internet and electronic bulletin board systems as
places to meet).
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variety of topics ranging from general health and dieting, to pregnancy,
sexual addiction, and physical disability, to name a few.243
Individuals who participate in those and similar online associations
find it easier to express themselves by "talking" alone at the keyboard, and
often rely on their anonymity to be able to interact with others.244 Research
supports findings that "computer-mediated communication" promotes
social interaction and relationships.245 By contrast, concerns about privacy
and messages that can be traced back to specific users may inhibit people
from sharing material that might be considered "taboo" and lead to self-
censorship. 246  Indeed, in a recent study, inner-city teenagers who were
given Internet access wrote hundreds of messages to their friends on topics
from rap music to sexual behavior, but suddenly and drastically quit
speaking online when project officials informed them that messages would
be monitored.247 The generalized concern arising from such accounts is
that an online identification requirement will result in self-censorship and
place a substantial burden on the speech and freedom of association of
persons who wish to participate in online communities.
History has shown that anonymity gives a voice to individuals who
have reason to fear that disclosure of their identities will subject them to
ostracism and public hostility.248 For individuals who are political activists
under a repressive regime or whistle-blowers speaking against a corrupt
government agency, anonymity may be a necessity. 49 While the whistle-
blower may not be an honored figure in our culture,250 recent high-profile
scandals in the corporate world, the FBI, and the Catholic Church
243. See Daniel Bubbeo, Help Is on Hand Online, NETGUIDE, Dec. 1996, at 109, 109-10,
115; see also Tim McLellen, An Introduction to Usenet News, at http://www.islandnet.com/
-tmc/html/articles/usentnws.htm#Newsgroups (last visited Nov. 21, 2002) (describing what a
Usenet newsgroup is and how it works). A search by the author using Yahoo! (a search engine
for locating content on the Internet) found 49,500 matches for the topic "sexual identity
discussion group," at http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query?p=sexual+identity+discussion
+group&hc=0&hs=0 (last visited June 19, 2001).
244. See Finn, supra note 242, at 222.
245. Id. at 220.
246. Id. at 221.
247. Yitzchak M. Binik et al., Ethical Issues in Conducting Sex Research on the Internet, 36
J. SEX RES. 82, 86 (1999).
248. See generally Elizabeth Pennisi, Challenger's Whistle-Blower: Hero and Outcast, THE
SCIENTIST (Jan. 20, 1990), at http://www.the-scientist.com/yrl990/jan/pennisipl_900120.html
(discussing how Roger Boisjoly's testimony regarding the dangers in design of a space vehicle's
booster rockets caused him to be ostracized by his community).
249. Grossman, supra note 6, at 24.
250. See Pennisi, supra note 248.
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demonstrate that informers willing to unmask insidious insiders can play a
crucial part in the process of social and political reform.251
Anonymity is especially valuable in the context of online
communication, which "promises to become one of the most powerful
democratic tools ever devised., 252 Both the disgruntled employee and the
unpopular critic prefer publishing their views online without running the
risk of being fired or raising the eyebrows of their neighbors. As such,
anonymity insulates individuals from self-censorship and gives a voice to
people who would otherwise not dare speak in a public forum. More
importantly, anonymous speech serves the long-standing goals of
preserving pluralism in a democratic society and challenging bigotry and
stereotyping by allowing persons to be judged solely on the merits of their
ideas without consideration of their personal characteristics.253
2. Permission to Speak?
If ratified by the Senate,254 the proposed treaty will have a dismal
effect on anonymous speech and privacy in cyberspace by imposing the
online equivalent of an identification requirement. This is because the
treaty fails to draw a distinction between computer criminals and legitimate
users of online anonymity, or between a criminal investigation and the
government's ability to compel people who have not been accused of
wrongdoing to identify themselves while surfing in cyberspace.
First, by requiring signatory nations to adopt legislative measures to
obtain the "expeditious preservation" of data stored by any computer
system,255 including traffic data,256 and by requiring providers to disclose
subscriber information under their control,257 the treaty adduces threats of
251. See Lynn Smith, Are Women Indeed the Fairer Sex? Prominent Whistle-Blowers Give
Rise to Speculation About Gender and Ethics, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at E1 (discussing the
role of women, particularly FBI agent Coleen Rowley and Enron vice-president Sherron Watkins,
in exposing government incompetence and corporate greed).
252. Branscomb, supra note 239, at 1640.
253. See GODWN, supra note 5, at 13-18.
254. International treaties are subject to approval by two-thirds of the votes in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
255. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 16(1).
256. Id. art. 17(1). Traffic data is "any computer data relating to a communication by means
of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of
communication, indicating the communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service." Id. art. 1 (d).
257. Id. art. 18(3)(b).
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disclosure and legal intimidation, chilling to anonymous online speech.
258
The concern is that anonymous remailers, who generally refuse to maintain
"server log files ' 259 or lists linking their anonymous clientele with
corresponding identifying customer information,26 ° will be required to
"preserve" such lists in the aftermath of the treaty.26'
Second, the drafters of the Convention have placed a fatal constraint
on "chained remailing, 262 the practice that anonymous remailers use to
erase the header identifying the sender and source of the message received.
Specifically, Article 16 of the Convention singles out traffic data for
"expeditious preservation," as well as any data that "is particularly
vulnerable to loss or modification." 263 Likewise, Article 17 ensures that
such "data is available regardless of whether one or more service providers
were involved in the transmission of that communication. ' '264 Because the
treaty does not define "stored computer data," if traffic data such as the
identifying header is stored merely for the duration of the connection,
arguably the government could request that it be preserved for an additional
ninety days. 265  In addition, the treaty requires providers to disclose the
information necessary to retrieve "any stored computer data," including
encrypted data,266 rendering ineffective the use of cryptographic messages
and threatening individuals with the loss of their anonymity.
Government actions that restrict or preclude persons from speaking in
258. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, In Two Significant Cases, ACLU
Seeks to Protect Anonymous Online Speakers from Legal Intimidation, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n022601b.html (Feb. 26, 2001) (discussing how the threat of
disclosure of identity inhibits online speech).
259. Kurt Thumlert, E-Metrics: Understanding Your Website's Traffic Data, SITEPOINT
(Feb. 21, 2001), at http://www.ecommercebase.com/article/354. When someone visits a Web
site, data communicated between the visitor's computer and the site, such as the visitor's
computer identity and IP address, the length of the visit, and the pages accessed on the site, is
recorded in the Web site's server log file, and can provide a scientific understanding of how
Internet users behave. Id.
260. See Flood Control, supra note 13, at 415-18.
261. See FAQ ABOUT THE CONvENTION, supra note 19. The Justice Department
distinguishes between "data retention," which would "require providers to collect and keep all or
a large portion of a provider's traffic as a routine matter," and "data preservation," which only
enables law enforcement to "instruct a service provider to set aside specified data that is already
in the service provider's possession until law enforcement procures the proper documents to
require the data's disclosure." Id.
262. See Flood Control, supra note 13, at 415-18.
263. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 16(1) (explaining that stored data with a
short life would be particularly vulnerable to both loss and modification).
264. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
265. See id. art. 16(2).
266. Id. art. 19(3).
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advance are constitutionally disfavored and presumptively invalid.267 The
unintended outcome of the Convention might then be to give governments
the authority to hold people accountable not only for what they speak,
write, or publish on the Internet, but also for identifying themselves each
time they log on to the Internet before they speak, write, or publish. To do
so will deprive persons of even the most rudimentary anonymity they enjoy
in the physical world.
As such, these specific provisions of the Convention impose
substantial "burdens on individual rights' 2 68 and raise serious problems of
vagueness-"particularly treacherous" where the fear of incurring criminal
sanctions will likely "deter those who seek to exercise [their] protected
First Amendment rights. 269  Given the treaty's vague procedural
safeguards,27° which permit United States citizens to be extradited to face
charges abroad for crimes that do not exist in the United States, and that
one could not reasonably have known to be proscribed, the treaty provokes
serious misgivings regarding due process. 271 Accordingly, if the provisions
of the Convention are at odds with constitutional standards of substantive
and procedural due process, federal courts cannot give the treaty full force
and effect.
272
B. Conflicts with Current Law
The Cybercrime Convention is intended as a "self-operating" treaty,
requiring no legislation by either Congress or the states to be
enforceable.273 Although specific provisions of the Convention may
require additional legislative action by Congress to regulate the details of a
process or right specified in the treaty,274 this requirement would not affect
267. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("Any prior restraint on
expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity."
(citations omitted)).
268. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976).
269. Id. at 76-77.
270. See Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 15.
271. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding that due process
requirements must provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that contemplated
conduct is illegal).
272. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957) (holding that treaties and executive
agreements must comply with existing constitutional standards).
273. Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 554 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied331
U.S. 808 (1947), reh 'g denied 331 U.S. 867 (1947). Implementing legislation is not "required for
the United States to become a party." See FAQ ABOUT THE CONVENTION, supra note 19.
274. See Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, arts. 2-14, 16-22, 27-35. The
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"the legal force of the treaty per se." 275 "Treaties between the United States
and other nations are [considered to be] the supreme law of the land," and
when there is a conflict between a treaty and a homegrown statutory
provision, the treaty supersedes it.
27 6
The Department of Justice claims on its Web site that it does not
"currently anticipate that implementing legislation" will be required for the
United States to become a party to the Convention.2 7 7 This assurance rests
on the contention that "the U.S. delegation has worked hard to balance
attentiveness to the suggestions of other countries with respect for the
strengths of current U.S. law."278  Nevertheless, there are significant
differences between the Convention's requirements for the expedited
preservation of traffic data and disclosure of identifying information, and
analogous "data preservation" and disclosure requirements under U.S. law.
Federal law concerning "data preservation" is found in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).27 9 The ECPA also provides
how the government can obtain both email communications and subscriber
or transactional records held by a provider of electronic communication.
280
Despite similarities to the ECPA, Articles 16 and 29 of the Convention are
far more sweeping 281 and apply to any type of computer data,282 including
traffic data that has been "stored by means of a computer system."
283
Under the Convention, data preservation may include any kind of personal
and business records, as well as traffic data, such as Web surfing
information that "reveals a large amount of detail of-and perhaps a
comprehensive profile on any individual. 284 Merely by visiting various
Convention addresses enforcement by requiring that each signatory nation "shall adopt such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary" to carry out its various provisions. Id. art.
18(1).
275. Copyright Convention with Great Britain, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 292, 293 (1854).
276. Mizugami v. Sharin West Overseas, Inc., 583 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992), appeal granted 602 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 1992), aft'd 615 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1993).
277. FAQ ABOUT THE CONVENTION, supra note 19.
278. Id.
279. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2705 (2002) (setting forth the legal standards
regarding access to stored communications as well as the requirements for evidence preservation).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1).
281. See Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, arts. 16, 29.
282. Id. art. 1(b) (broadly defining "computer data" as "any representation of facts,
information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer system, including a
program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function").
283. Id. arts. 16, 29.
284. Privacy International, Privacy International Comments to Working Paper on Data
Retention, EU Forum on Cybercrime, at http://www.privacyintemational.org/issues/
cybercrime/eu/pi-euforum-retention.html (Nov. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Working Paper
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Web sites for a few minutes, users can unwittingly "reveal a wide and
detailed spectrum of their personal situation," including medical, financial,
and "other highly personal information. ' '285 By contrast, the ECPA's "data
preservation" provision is limited to customer communications or
records2 86 and may only require a service provider "to preserve records and
other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or
other process. 287
Traffic data holds special significance to anonymous remailers who
erase message traffic to ensure untraceable online anonymity for their
288customers. By requiring the preservation of "a sufficient amount of
traffic data in order to identify th[e] service provider and the path through
which the communication was transmitted,, 289 and "regardless of whether
one or more service providers were involved in the transmission, ' 290 the
Convention places a new burden on providers to be able to trace every
anonymous message, record every Web site visited, and in effect, be able to
capture "a full profile of an individual's personal and professional
associations and activities.",29' By contrast, there is no analogous provision
under the ECPA.292
Similarly, there is a concern that governments who have signed a
treaty requiring them to enact laws on the disclosure of subscriber
identifying information 293 will compel service providers to always be able
to identify their customers.294 Under such an international regime,
anonymous remailers who refuse to keep logs of message traffic 295 would
no longer be able to operate. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice
insists that the Convention makes a distinction between data retention
requirements, "which would require providers to collect and keep all or a
large portion of a provider's traffic as a routine matter, and preservation
Comments].
285. Id.
286. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B)-2703(c)(1)(C).
287. Id. § 2703(f).
288. See Flood Control, supra note 13, at 416.
289. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 30(1).
290. Id. art. 17(l)(a).
291. CDT Comments, supra note 125.
292. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (The ECPA requires providers to preserve the contents
of electronic communications as well as information regarding a customer's or subscriber's
identity, but does not require tracing of anonymous messages or tracking of Internet traffic.).
293. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 18(1)(b).
294. CDT Comments, supra note 125; see Scheeres, supra note 51.
295. Flood Control, supra note 13, at 416.
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requirements, which enable law enforcement authorities ... to [instruct] a
service provider to set aside specified data that is already in the service
provider's possession."
296
The distinction cannot assure providers of anonymous services that
they will not be required to retain any data beyond whatever data is
otherwise retained by them for business purposes, such as billing.297
Moreover, it is not relevant whether a service provider needs only to collect
data "within its existing technical capability '298 because providers
continuously filter, store, and process copious amounts of traffic data. As
the price of communication becomes less dependent on distance or
destination and there is no longer any need to store data for billing
purposes, enforcement authorities may request that a minimum amount of
data be kept for a sufficient time necessary to facilitate the criminal
investigations envisioned by the treaty.
299
Lastly, unlike the ECPA, which contains some protection for the
service provider, even allowing a court order to be quashed "if the
information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or
compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on
such provider," 300 there is no comparable provision under the Convention.
To the contrary, Articles 29 and 30- pertaining to mutual assistance
between nations-limit a party's ability to refuse a request for expedited
preservation or disclosure of data.30 1
C. De Facto Identification Requirement
In examining the Convention's identification requirements from the
perspective of the First Amendment, the first issue to be determined is what
level of scrutiny is applicable. 302 "[T]he appropriate level of scrutiny is
initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and
permitted speech on the basis of content. 30 3  Government regulation of
speech is content-neutral if it is "justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech.
3 0 4
296. FAQ ABOUT THE CONVENTION, supra note 19.
297. See id.; see also Explanatory Report, supra note 113, paras. 151-52.
298. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, arts. 20-21.
299. See Working Paper Comments, supra note 284.
300. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
301. See Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, arts. 29-30.
302. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
303. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
304. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
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At first glance, exacting scrutiny appears to be the applicable standard
by which to examine a restriction on the ability to communicate
anonymously over the Internet.305 Because the identity of the speaker is no
different from other components of a document's contents that the author is
free to include or exclude, 30 6 the Convention's provisions mandating the
preservation of traffic data and disclosure of the subscriber's identity
constitute presumptively invalid content-based restrictions.30 7 Thus, in
order to overcome the presumption of invalidity, the Convention's specific
provisions must further an "overriding state interest" and be "narrowly
tailored" to achieve the articulated interest.30 8
Nevertheless, despite some scholarly suggestions that exacting
scrutiny should apply to all restrictions on speech,30 9 it may be argued that
the Convention's provisions do not aim at prohibiting anonymous
communication, 310 but rather aim at the "secondary effects" 311 of such
communication. 3 2 In this respect, the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,313 is relevant, as it supports the
proposition that "an otherwise content-based restriction on speech can be




305. See ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
306. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
307. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (holding content-based
regulations presumptively invalid).
308. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
309. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, nho's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REv. 627,628 (1990).
310. See Explanatory Report, supra note 113, para. 62.
The modification of traffic data for the purpose of facilitating anonymous
communications (e.g., the activities of anonymous remailer systems), or the
modification of data for the purpose of secure communications (e.g. encryption),
should in principle be considered a legitimate protection of privacy and, therefore,
be considered as being undertaken with right.
Id.
311. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (emphasis
omitted).
312. See Explanatory Report, supra note 113, para. 62 (explaining that the Convention aims
to criminalize abuses related to anonymous communications, such as where the identifying
information is altered in order to conceal the identity of the perpetrator committing a crime).
313. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47 (holding that a zoning ordinance barring adult movie
theatres from locating within 1000 feet of a residence, school, church, or park was a valid
content-neutral restriction because it aimed not at the content of the movies, but at the "secondary
effects" of the theatres on the surrounding community).
314. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
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Content-neutral regulations "that have an incidental effect on First
Amendment rights will be upheld if they further an important or substantial
governmental interest., 315  For example, in American Library Ass'n v.
Reno,316 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, 317 which
required producers of sexually-explicit materials to determine and maintain
records of the identities of performers, was a content-neutral statute having
only an incidental effect on the rights of performers to remain
anonymous.318 The court held that Congress enacted the statute not to
regulate the content of speech, but "to prevent the use of underage
performers in the production of sexually explicit materials. 3 19 Further, the
court rejected the district court's contention that the statute invaded the
privacy of adult performers, discouraged them from engaging in protected
expression, and made it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for
performers to remain anonymous.32 °
Notwithstanding the decisions in City of Renton and American
Library Ass 'n, the limits on anonymous speech placed by the Convention
may be distinguished from the restrictions on speech in those cases.
Whereas in both City of Renton and American Library Ass 'n the restrictions
incidentally burden a predominantly salacious category of speech, the
provisions of the Convention burden anonymous speech, whose primary
function is the communication of "unpopular or unconventional views.,
321
Further, as the McIntyre Court recognized, because anonymous speech
"exemplifies the purposes behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular, ' 322 the applicable standard of constitutional
review deserves the most exacting scrutiny.
Moreover, the provisions of the Convention do not incidentally
burden anonymous speech, but rather directly undermine the technical
ability of remailers to assure the anonymity of their users, thus disabling
concurring in judgment).
315. Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
316. 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
317. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7501, 102 Stat. 4181, 4485-4503 (1988), amended by The
Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 301, 104 Stat. 4789, 4816-17 (1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(1) (2000)).
318. See Am. Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
319. Id.
320. See id. at 94.
321. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
322. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
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the only vehicle for truly anonymous speech in cyberspace.323 Unlike the
zoning regulations at issue in City of Renton, which allowed for
"reasonable alternative avenues of communication" by permitting theatres
to locate on the farther outskirts of town,324 the provisions of the
Convention do not provide any alternative means for persons to
communicate anonymously in cyberspace. In the aftermath of the treaty,
remailers will not be able to offer untraceable anonymity.
Whereas anonymous speakers use remailers and anonymizers because
they have reason to fear that disclosure of their identities will subject them
to ostracism and public hostility, the adult performers in American Library
Ass 'n, who had to disclose their identities to producers, were not likely to
be subjected to stigmatization, harassment, and ridicule by the very
producers they helped enrich.325 Lastly, neither City of Renton nor
American Library Ass'n involved the abridgment of one's freedom to
associate for social or political reasons. "Although associations formed for
the pursuit of private economic interests have received some [F]irst
Amendment protection," that protection does not receive the same exacting
standard of review as provided to those who communicate for political and
social reasons.326
D. The Treaty's Provisions Fail Exacting Scrutiny
The Supreme Court applies "exacting scrutiny ' 327 to determine
whether the subordinating interests of the state have a "substantial
relation ' 328 to the information required to be disclosed. If the government
demonstrates a compelling interest substantially related to the disclosure,
the Court then weighs the interest against the "burdens on individual
rights." 329 To find an intrusion on First Amendment liberties, the Court
demands a showing of "reasonable probability" that requiring disclosure of
individuals' "names [and identities] will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
323. See Flood Control, supra note 13, at 418-24. Remailers are the primary vehicles for
untraceable anonymous and pseudonymous speech. Id. Users using pseudonyms can always be
identified by their online identities, but cannot be traced to their true identities in the physical
world. Id.
324. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.
325. Am. Library Ass n, 33 F.3d at 94.
326. Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 238 (3d Cir. 1985).
327. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
328. Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
329. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
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,,330parties.
Arguably, the government has a compelling interest to combat crime
and, therefore, may require providers to preserve data stored in any
331 332computer service, including traffic data, as well as disclose subscriber
information under their control.333 Similarly, government investigators
may have a compelling need to obtain the information necessary to unlock
the encrypted data,334 without which it is not possible to identify the sender
and routing information detailing the electronic path of the chained
remailing. 335 But such a compelling interest can only apply on a case-by-
case basis, not as a blanket requirement that affects all legitimate providers
and users of online anonymity resulting in a de facto ban on electronic
anonymity.
Although the government interest may be substantially related to the
data requested on a case-by-case basis, the provisions of the Convention
are not narrowly tailored to achieve that end through the use of "the least
restrictive means.'336  Instead, the regulations sweep innocent, protected
speech within their scope. Specifically, Article 16 applies to any data that
is stored within a computer system.337 An anonymous remailer, a bulletin
board, or a Usenet service may be ordered to preserve information that it
would not ordinarily keep during the course of its business. 338 Not only
does the information have the potential of exposing unwary customers to a
breach of their anonymity, it is also capable of revealing their entire
"personal and professional associations and activities.339
Furthermore, the Convention formulates procedures giving police the
authority to seize entire computer systems and to "render inaccessible or
remove those computer data in the accessed computer system. '' 340 Thus,
police will be able to seize computer information from legitimate service
providers and users who have no connection with the crime. Such
activities not only place substantial "burdens on individual rights, 34' but
330. Id. at 74.
331. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 16.
332. Id. art. 17.
333. Id. art. 18(3)(b).
334. See id. art. 19(4).
335. Flood Control, supra note 13, at 415-18.
336. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
337. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 16.
338. See CDT Comments, supra note 125.
339. Id.
340. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 19(3)(d).
341. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
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unfairly target those individuals who are most likely to experience "threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
parties '342 because they are the persons most likely to use anonymous
remailers and encryption in the first place.343
E. Diminished Expectations
Under current United States law, an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a record or other information
pertaining to one's communication service or remote computer service. 344
Some telecommunications providers, however, such as remailers and
anonymizer services, do not regularly keep identifying records, and are not
required to keep them under United States law.345 By requiring providers
to retain such data, the Convention will alter these expectations.
The ability of remailers to maintain the anonymity of their customers
will be foreclosed by the requirement that every provider supply authorities
with any information stored in its computer system, or otherwise risk being
shut down.346 Further, without an expectation of anonymity in the traffic
data that can be retained by remailers, individuals' ability to communicate
on the Internet, without disclosing their identities, will be severely
curtailed.
Given the broadly written Article 16, which does not limit
preservation of data to communication data,347 remailers will face the
difficult prospect of refusing to comply with authorities by not maintaining
information to identify their customers, such as billing and transactional
data. Paradoxically, the attempt by governments to trace every call may
only motivate users to become more untraceable, and drive legitimate
remailers out of business, while encouraging others to start operating in
locations beyond the jurisdiction of the Convention.
342. Id. at 74.
343. See Nadine Strossen, Protecting Privacy and Free Speech in Cyberspace, 89 GEO. L.J.
2103, 2108-09 (2001) (discussing the connection between privacy and freedom of speech for
individuals researching sexual orientation).
344. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at * 11 (holding that a person does not have an expectation of privacy in
the account information given to the internet service provider in order to establish an account).
345. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining "electronic
communication service" as "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications").
346. See Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 19(3).
347. Id. art. 16.
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Because the provisions of the treaty are drafted in very broad terms,348
a final consideration is that United States corporations and Internet users
may also find themselves liable for crimes that they were not even aware
existed. 349 By contrast, due process requires that a criminal statute provide
adequate notice to a person that his contemplated conduct is illegal.350
Given that an even "greater degree of specificity" is required when First
Amendment rights are involved,351  the Convention fails to pass
constitutional muster.
Proponents of online identification point out that "true anonymity,
3 52
which allows users to become untraceable online, is unlike anything that
could be tolerated in the physical world simply because one cannot
possibly go completely unnoticed outside of cyberspace.353 In the physical
world, so goes the argument, something is always left behind, be it
fingerprints at the scene of the crime, the distinctive markings of a
particular typewriter used to print a ransom note, or some "nonanonymous
action sufficient to allow [one] to be identified and charged with the
offense. 354  The argument is that truly anonymous communication is
beyond the reach of the law because it poses an insurmountable problem of
enforcement, so that prohibition is "the only effective deterrent.,
355
But even if the physical world were an Orwellian utopia where no
crime went unsolved because everyone's identity was sufficiently known,
such an argument runs into the paradox that full accountability places a
complete ban on anonymity.356 Thus, even if one were to accept at face
value the requirement that something about the identity of the user must be
348. CDT Comments, supra note 125; see also FAQ ABOUT THE CONVENTION, supra note
19.
349. See Cybercrime Convention, supra note 103, art. 29(3) ("[D]ual criminality shall not
be required as a condition to providing such preservation.").
350. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617.
351. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77.
352. Branscomb, supra note 239, at 1641. A truly anonymous communication insulates the
speaker's identity from disclosure but also invites the danger inherent in foreclosing detection.
See id. at 1641-42.
353. See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity,
Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 146 (1996)
(arguing Mrs. McIntyre's actions were not anonymous at all and that the absence of anonymity is
a precondition for all enforcement).
354. Id.
355. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace, " 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993,
1051 (1994).
356. See Branscomb, supra note 239, at 1641-42 (suggesting that providers "must grapple
with the propriety of anonymity").
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made available to ensure some de minimis authentication, the answer to
what that something should be differs depending on whether governments,
business interests, or civil liberties advocates provide the answer.
Indeed, a persistent criticism has been "the non-transparent manner in
which this Convention has been developed,, 357 and the lack of interest on
the part of the Council of Europe to "substantially incorporate the views
and concerns" 358 of non-governmental groups on the issues of privacy and
civil liberties. In the United States, critics have accused the Department of
Justice and the FBI of using a foreign forum to install an international
police regime that predominantly advances law enforcement interests over
those of ordinary citizens and businesses, and then "bring it back to the
U.S. as an international treaty-which obliges Congress to enact it," 359 a
practice described as "policy laundering." 360  However, this closed
approach to regulating the Internet can only chill speech, limit consumer
choices and privacy, and provide a disincentive for the development of
technological solutions to cybercrime.36'
By contrast, proposals by non-governmental groups and experts
regarding cyber-security emphasize technological developments and
fixes.362 Not surprisingly, the same technology that allows cybercriminals
to hide their identities can also prevent them from reaching their potential
victims. 363 A lawless cyber-frontier is not the sole alternative to an Internet
identification requirement and expanded government powers. Rather,
greater preventive measures by the private sector and technical innovation
are needed to improve security in cyberspace. 36
To ensure user accountability 365 while preserving avenues for
357. ACLU Letter, supra note 138.
358. Id.
359. David Banisar, Love Letter's Last Victim, SECURITY FOCUS ONLINE (May 22, 2000),
at http://online.securityfocus.com/news/39.
360. Id.
361. Declan McCullagh, White House Defends Cybersecurity Plan, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept.
20, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-958775.html (citing cautionary statement of Orson
Swindle, one of the Federal Trade Commission's five commissioners, regarding "attempts to
enact a broad privacy law to regulate the data collection practices of Internet companies").
362. See Emma Ogilvie, Cyberstalking, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIM. JUST.,
Sept. 2000, at 4-5, available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/til66.pdf (discussing
that many of the solutions to cyberstalking are more likely to come from "technological fixes"
than from legislation).
363. Id.
364. See McCullagh, supra note 361.
365. See Branscomb, supra note 239, at 1641-42 (discussing lack of user accountability as a
negative aspect of untraceable anonymity).
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anonymous online communication, the Internet can be zoned for various
uses that offer individuals varying degrees of anonymity or privacy, while
simultaneously requiring accountability by some means of
366authentication. For example, online retailers, banks, content providers,
and the panoply of personal and professional cyber-associations can readily
establish authentication requirements commensurate with the type of
services they offer. Such a voluntary system ensures that users can choose
how much information to disclose and to whom, depending on the specific
transaction. Just like in the real world, such a system allows persons a
greater degree of anonymity when browsing through a catalogue or when
sending a letter than when purchasing a plane ticket or conducting a
banking transaction.
V. CONCLUSION
Absent evidence linking anonymous servers to any criminal or
terrorist conspiracy,367 the Convention's broad identification requirement is
overblown. While much can be done about security on the Internet, putting
an end to untraceable anonymity is not the way to do it. The Convention's
broad requirements for data preservation, and provisions for the disclosure
of subscriber information and encryption code pose a chilling effect on
anonymous online speech. To enact this Convention, lawmakers must
introduce such legislative and other measures that preserve online
anonymity, or reject the treaty in its entirety. While the United States has a
strong interest to prosecute and punish individuals who misuse computers
366. See Scott Chamey, Prepared Witness Testimony, On-line Fraud and Crime: Are
Consumers Safe?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
(May 23, 2001), at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/0523200lHearing235/
Chamey357.htm (discussing three ways of authenticating an unknown buyer's identity on the
Internet). Mr. Chamey is a Principal of Digital Risk Management and Forensics at
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Id.
367. Matthew Fordahl, Anonymous E-Mail Services May Have Increased Since Sept. 11,
DETNEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2001), at http://www.detnews.com/2001/technews/0112/09/technology-
362425.htm.
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by committing crimes that have an effect in this country, those aims should
be pursued without compromising time-honored First Amendment liberties.
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